Threat Intelligence April 2025 10 min read

Threat Hunting with MITRE ATT&CK

A practical methodology for hypothesis-driven threat hunting using MITRE ATT&CK — from choosing hunting hypotheses and writing detection queries, to measuring your programme's effectiveness.

Published
Author: Sid Faza Category: Threat Intelligence
// 01

What is Threat Hunting?

Threat hunting is the proactive, human-led search for attacker activity that has not yet triggered any automated alert. It is the opposite of reactive SOC work — instead of waiting for detections to fire, the threat hunter asks: 'If an adversary were already inside this network, where would they be, and what would they look like?'

Threat hunting is structured thinking about attacker behaviour, expressed as data queries. The best hunters are curious, methodical, and deeply familiar with both attacker TTPs and their own environment's normal.

Most mature SOC programmes run three tiers: L1/L2 analysts handle alert triage, incident responders investigate confirmed events, and threat hunters proactively search in the gap between alerts. The gap is where advanced persistent threats live for months.

// 02

The Hunting Methodology

01
Choose Hypothesis
02
Define Data Sources
03
Write Query
04
Analyse Results
05
Create Detection
06
Document Findings

Every hunt starts with a hypothesis — a specific, testable statement about attacker behaviour. Without a hypothesis, you are not hunting; you are browsing. Good hypotheses are derived from threat intelligence, ATT&CK techniques, or anomalies noticed during routine work.

Hypothesis-Driven

Start from a specific ATT&CK technique or threat intel report. E.g., 'APT29 uses scheduled tasks for persistence — are there any unusual schtasks on endpoints?'

Baseline Deviation

Compare current behaviour to historical norms. Unusually high DNS query volumes, new parent-child process relationships, or first-time-seen executables.

Intel-Driven

Receive an IOC from a threat intel feed or ISAC. Hunt for that specific indicator across your environment before it fires an alert.

Situational Awareness

After a major vulnerability disclosure or geopolitical event, proactively hunt for exploitation patterns targeting your industry.

// 03

Using ATT&CK Effectively

MITRE ATT&CK is the threat hunter's atlas. It catalogues 14 tactic categories — from Initial Access through Impact — each containing techniques and sub-techniques used by real adversaries. The key is using it as a prioritisation framework, not reading it cover-to-cover.

TacticIDHunt PriorityKey Techniques to Hunt
Initial AccessTA0001HighPhishing (T1566), External Remote Services (T1133)
ExecutionTA0002CriticalPowerShell (T1059.001), WMI (T1047), Scheduled Tasks (T1053)
PersistenceTA0003CriticalRegistry Run Keys (T1547.001), New Services (T1543)
Credential AccessTA0006CriticalLSASS Dump (T1003.001), Kerberoasting (T1558.003)
Lateral MovementTA0008HighPass-the-Hash (T1550.002), PsExec (T1021.002)
ExfiltrationTA0010HighWeb Service (T1567), DNS Tunnelling (T1048.003)
💡 Pro Tip

Use the ATT&CK Navigator to build a heatmap of your current detection coverage. Any technique with no coverage is a potential hunting hypothesis.

// 04

Writing Good Hypotheses

The quality of your hunt is bounded by the quality of your hypothesis. A good hypothesis is specific, falsifiable, and tied to real attacker behaviour.

Bad HypothesisGood HypothesisWhy Better
'Attackers might be in our network''APT41 uses PowerShell -EncodedCommand for execution — are there encoded PS commands executed outside business hours on endpoints?'Specific technique, timeframe, and asset scope
'Check DNS for weird stuff''DNS queries with payloads >100 bytes in the subdomain field may indicate DNS tunnelling — find hosts with unusually long average query lengths'Measurable threshold, specific IOC pattern
'Look for malware''LockBit uses vssadmin to delete shadow copies before encryption — are there any vssadmin calls in the last 7 days not from a backup job?'Specific tool, specific action, known legitimate baseline
// 05

Detection Queries — Splunk SPL

Once the hypothesis is written, translate it into queries against your data sources. Here are three production-ready hunting queries:

splunk — PowerShell Encoded Command Hunt
| Hunt: T1059.001 — PowerShell EncodedCommand
index=windows EventCode=4688
  CommandLine IN ("*-EncodedCommand*", "*-enc *", "*-e *")
  NOT user IN ("NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM", "svc_backup")
| eval hour=strftime(_time, "%H")
| where hour < 7 OR hour > 20 | Outside business hours
| stats count by ComputerName, user, CommandLine
| sort -count
splunk — Scheduled Task Creation Hunt
| Hunt: T1053.005 — Suspicious Scheduled Task
index=windows EventCode=4698
| rex field=TaskContent "(?P[^<]+)"
| where match(cmd, "(?i)(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|regsvr32)")
| table _time, ComputerName, SubjectUserName, TaskName, cmd
| sort -_time
splunk — Lateral Movement via PsExec
| Hunt: T1021.002 — SMB Lateral Movement
index=windows EventCode=7045
  ServiceName IN ("PSEXESVC", "paexec", "remcom")
| join ComputerName
  [search index=windows EventCode=4624 LogonType=3]
| table _time, ComputerName, AccountName, ServiceName, ImagePath
| sort -_time
// 06

Measuring Hunt Effectiveness

MetricDescriptionTarget
Hypotheses per monthNumber of distinct hunts conducted≥4 per hunter per month
Confirmed findings rateHunts that found real attacker activity or unknown risk≥20% of hunts
New detections createdSigma/SPL rules written from hunt findings≥1 per 3 hunts
ATT&CK coverage increaseTechnique coverage % growth quarter-over-quarter+5% per quarter
Dwell time reductionAverage time attackers present before detectionTarget: <24h
Note

A hunt that finds nothing is not a failed hunt. Absence of evidence builds confidence in your detection coverage and documents the work for audit purposes.

// 07

Getting Started Today

You do not need a dedicated threat hunting team to start. Any L2 analyst with SIEM access can run their first hunt in an afternoon.

  • Pick one ATT&CK technique relevant to your industry threat profile
  • Write a one-sentence hypothesis — 'If technique X is being used, I expect to see Y in data source Z'
  • Run the query — investigate anything anomalous
  • Document the hunt — findings or no findings, write it up
  • Convert findings to detections — every successful hunt should produce a permanent detection rule
💡 Pro Tip

Start with T1059 (Scripting/Command Execution) — it has excellent data availability in Windows Event Logs and is used in almost every intrusion. Your first hunt will teach you more than 10 hours of reading.